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Abstract: The predictions that emerge from tournament theory have been tested in a number of 
sports-related settings.  Since sporting events involving individuals (golf, tennis, running, auto rac-
ing) feature rank order tournaments with relatively large payoffs and easily observable outcomes, 
sports is a natural setting for such tests.  In this paper, we test the predictions of tournament the-
ory using a unique race-level data set from NASCAR.  Most of the previous tests of tournament 
theory using NASCAR data have used either season level data or race level data from a few sea-
sons.  Our empirical work uses race level NASCAR data for 1,114 races over the period 1975-2009.  
Our results support the predictions of tournament theory: the larger the spread in prizes paid in 
the race, measured by the standard deviation of prizes paid or the interquartile range of prizes 
paid, the higher the average speed in the race.  Our results account for the length of the track, the 
number of entrants, the number of caution flags, and unobservable year and week heterogeneity. 
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Introduction 
 
A substantial literature testing the predictions of tournament theory in the context of 
sport has emerged over the past 30 years.  Sport is a natural setting for testing the predic-
tions of tournament theory because the nonlinear prize structure of many sporting events 
clearly follows the predictions of the model, the prizes are often large, and the perfor-
mance of the contestants can be readily observed.  Tests from golf, bowling, foot races, 
motorcycle races, tennis, and team sports have generally confirmed the predictions of the 
model: effort depends on the prize structure put in place by the tournament organizer. 
Curiously, one setting with relatively few tests of tournament theory is stock car 
racing, a popular form of automobile racing that grew from relatively humble roots in the 
southern United States into an extremely popular form of car racing.  Stock car racing orig-
inally referred to races featuring vehicles that had not been modified from the original 
factory form.  It now refers to races involving any production-based vehicles, in contrast to 
race cars, for example Formula 1 cars or drag racing cars, that are custom built for racing 
purposes.   Many stock car racing circuits exist in the US, Mexico, Canada, the UK, New 
Zealand and Brazil.  The most popular, and most visible, stock car racing circuit is the Na-
tional Association for Stock Car Racing (NASCAR); NASCAR’s Sprint Cup Series (formerly 
called the NEXTEL Cup Series and Winston Cup Series) is the premier stock car racing se-
ries in the world and has been in existence since 1949. 
Von Allmen (2001) laid out the key theoretical issue associated with the reward 
structure in NASCAR.   Von Allmen (2001) pointed out that the presence of NASCAR reve-
nues generated by advertising, the fact that the season long NASCAR points competition 
generates monetary incentives that extend beyond single races, the fact that some NAS-
CAR drivers can earn significant sponsor bonuses without winning a race and also can 
share race winnings with their team, and the relatively compressed nature of race win-
nings in NASCAR suggest that standard contest theory might not apply to NASCAR races.  
Instead, von Allmen argued that the “sabotage effect” model developed by Lazear (1989) 
in the context of winner take all contests where one competitor in a tournament can en-
gage in behavior detrimental to other competitors could also apply to NASCAR races.  In 
this context, Lazear (1989) showed that the prize structure for eliciting maximum effort is 
compressed relative to the optimum prize stricture when sabotage is not possible.  Alter-
natively, von Allmen (2001) posited that the large sponsorship revenues generated by car 
advertising generates incentives for consistent driver performance rather than maximum 
driver effort to win races. Subsequent empirical literature focused primarily on analyzing 
sabotage and consistency in NASCAR driver performance.   3 
We perform a test of the standard contest theoretic model applied to NASCAR. The 
only previous test of contest theory using NASCAR data, Becker and Huselid (1992), used 
data from a single NASCAR racing season which limited their ability to capture variability 
in effort.   We argue that the prize structure of NASCAR races is sufficiently non-linear to 
generate contest incentives for drivers to put forth maximum effort, despite the potential 
for sabotage effects during races. We analyze the outcomes of more than 1,100 NASCAR 
races from the 1975 to 2009 seasons.  Estimates of a reduced form econometric model of 
driver effort show that the prize structure in NASCAR races generates incentives for driv-
ers to put forth more effort.  The empirical results indicate that a one standard deviation 
increase in the spread of the prize distribution increases the average speed of the winning 
car by about 2.5 miles per hour over the course of the race, controlling for unobservable 
track-specific heterogeneity, week of season and year effects, and other characteristics of 
races.  As tournament theory predicts, NASCAR drivers drive faster in races with a larger 
spread in the prize distribution, other things equal.         
 
 
Predictions and Tests of Tournament Theory 
 
Frick (2004) summarized the key predictions of contest theory and surveyed the empirical 
tests of the predictions of contest theory based on data from athletic contests.  The basic 
idea behind contest theory is that participants in a contest possess endowments of ability 
and talent and choose an optimal amount of effort to put forth in the contest given the 
endowment of ability and talent of their competitors and the prize structure of the con-
test.  The contest is assumed to be rank ordered – prizes are awarded based on relative 
performance only – and the prizes known in advance are increasing in rank.  Performance 
in the contest depends on both the optimal effort chosen by all participants and a random 
component attributed to luck and other random factors outside the control of the partici-
pant. Since the contest has multiple competitors, the optimal choice of effort depends on 
the distribution of talent and ability across the competitors and each competitor’s expec-
tation of the effort put forth by other participants, as well as the prize structure. 
Three key testable predictions emerge from contest theory.  First, optimal effort 
depends positively on the size and spread of the prize distribution; second, optimal effort 
depends negatively on the marginal cost of effort; third, optimal effort depends on the 
effect of changes in effort on the probability of winning the tournament. 
In general, empirical tests of the predictions of tournament theory focus on the re-
lationship between the size and structure of the prize pool in tournaments and the effort 
put forth by the contestants.  Sporting events represent a natural setting for testing the   4 
predictions of tournament theory because both the effort put forth by the contestants 
and the size and structure of the prize pool can easily be observed.  Early tests of the pre-
dictions of tournament theory in a sports setting include tests using data from profession-
al golf (Ehrenberg and Bognanno,1990a, 1990b, Orszag, 1994, Melton and Zorn, 2000), 
professional bowling (Bognanno, 1990), horse racing (Fernie and Metcalf, 1999, Coffey 
and  Maloney,  2010),  tennis  (Lallemand,  et  al,  2008,  Sunde  2009),  motorcycle  racing 
(Maloney and Terkun, 2002), and foot races (Maloney and McCormick, 2000; Lynch and 
Zax, 2000, Frick and Prinz 2007). 
  Von Allmen (2001) posited that other alternative models could be applied to NAS-
CAR race outcomes, documenting a number of features of NASCAR races that differ from 
other sporting events.  NASCAR drivers compete for three types of awards in each race: 
cash winnings based on rank order of finish in the race, points that accrue over the course 
of the season and count toward a season-long competition with a sizable monetary re-
ward to the driver who accumulates the most points over the course of the season, and 
other bonus payments for in-race accomplishments like the number of laps lead or win-
ning the pole position in the race.  Also, many NASCAR drivers are members of multi-car 
teams, and compensation from individual events can be shared with the team owner and 
other team members.  In addition to team membership, sponsorship revenues paid by 
companies who place corporate logos on the cars also contribute heavily to the revenues 
earned by teams. 
  Each race offers a standard non-linear rank order prize structure.  Beyond this 
standard prize structure, several types of bonuses also apply to each race, including incen-
tives for leading the race for a number of laps, bonuses paid by certain equipment manu-
facturers if a car using their equipment finishes among the top positions, and incentives 
paid to the current leader in the season-long points competition if he wins the current 
race and other bonuses.  Points that count toward the season long total points competi-
tion are also awarded for rank order finish in each race.  The distribution of points award-
ed for order of finish in each race is relatively compressed compared to the monetary 
prize structure of the race, although the pay out awarded at the end of the season based 
on total points earned is highly non-linear.  In 2007, the winner of the season-long points 
competition, Jimmie Johnson, won $7.3 million for finishing first in the points competition 
(he also won $7.6 million in individual races), the second place finisher in the points com-
petition won $3.2 million and the third place finisher $2.3 million.  von Allmen (2001) 
pointed out that these factors, and the presence of large sponsorship revenues derived 
from placing logos on cars that depend on the visibility of the car during the race and not 
on the rank order finish in each race, flatten the overall reward structure over the course 
of a NASCAR season, reducing the incentive for drivers to provide additional effort in spe-  5 
cific races and also reducing the applicability of standard tournament theory to NASCAR 
outcomes.  Because of the compressed nature of the overall NASCAR reward structure 
and the possibility of sabotage in races, von Allmen (2001) argued that Lazear’s (1989) 
model of tournaments with sabotage can be applied to NASCAR, that the compensation 
structure in NASCAR was unable to generate sufficient incentives to generate additional 
effort on the part of NASCAR drivers. 
A small but growing literature analyzes the outcomes of car races.
1 Becker and 
Huselid (1992) used data from 28 races organized by NASCAR in 1990 to test the predi c-
tions of tournament theory.  Becker and Huselid (1992) analyzed the performance of 44 
individual drivers in each of the  28 contests.  Their measure of effort reflected both the 
normalized average speed of the winning driver in each race, where the fastest average 
winning speed was set equal to 1.00 and slower average winning speeds assigned higher 
index values, and the rank order of finish for each driver.  The index of average winning 
speeds was multiplied by the rank order finish to generate an effort measure that is equal 
to 1.0 for the first place finisher with the highest average speed; all other drivers have 
effort scores larger than one, with the value depending on both their finishing position in 
each race and the winning drivers average speed in that race relative to the fastest ave r-
age winning speed in the season.   Note that this measure of effort, while varying ac ross 
participants, is difficult to interpret because it mixes  absolute (average speed of the win-
ning driver) and relative (rank order of finish) measures of effort.  It also does not preserve 
within-race rank ordering.  Their measure of the prize structure in NASCAR races included 
a variable reflecting the average difference in prizes awarded to the first twenty finishers 
in each race compared to drivers who finished outside the top twenty.  Becker and Huselid 
(1992) concluded that the larger the difference in average winnings of the top twenty fin-
ishers compared to finishers outside the top twenty in each race, the more effort put forth 
by drivers, holding race-specific factors and driver ability constant.  These results are con-
sistent with the predictions of tournament theory, in that a more unequal distribution of 
prize money induces greater effort by participants. 
Despite the obvious limitations of the results in Becker and Huselid (1992), in 
terms of the limitations of the dependent variable and the use  of race data from a single 
season, subsequent research did not focus on testing the predictions of tournament theo-
ry using data from NASCAR races.  Additional empirical research focused on the applicabil-
                                                           
1   Economists have also examined the effects of uncertainty of outcome on interest in NASCAR (Berkowitz, 
et al, 2010), risk taking in NASCAR racing (O’Roark and Wood, 2004; Sobel and Nesbitt, 2007; Dole, 2007; 
Bothner, et al, 2007), and the role of sponsorship and status (Bothner, et al, 2010; Groothius, et al, 
2010).    6 
ity of alternative models to NASCAR race outcomes.   Depken and Wilson (2004) analyzed 
end of season outcomes in NASCAR over the period 1949-2001 and concluded that the 
relationship between the concentration of performance points and the concentration of 
prize winnings supported the sabotage hypothesis.  Schwartz et al. (2007) analyzed race 
level NASCAR data from the 2003 and 2004 season to look for additional evidence sup-
porting  the  sabotage  hypothesis  and  the  inefficiency  of  the  NASCAR  compensation 
scheme.  They find evidence of heterogeneity in driver skills, and evidence that less skilled 
drivers  generate  more  accidents  during  races,  supporting  the  sabotage  hypothesis.  
Groothius et al. (2010) claim that the monetary prize structure in NASCAR is linear, and 
investigated the role of sponsorship in NASCAR; they reject the idea that the monetary 
prize structure in NASCAR is insufficient to generate incentives for NASCAR drivers to sup-
ply additional effort in races, and instead explore the idea that consistency, providing sus-
tained periods of camera exposure for sponsors, drives the behavior of NASCAR drivers. 
  Much of the existing empirical research on outcomes in NASCAR races focuses on 
the idea that the prize structure of NASCAR cannot generate sufficient contest incentives 
to induce drivers to supply increased effort in races.  These studies posit that the com-
pressed prize structure, presence of the end of season points competition, importance of 
sponsorship revenues, and negative consequences of supplying additional effort in con-
tests, either through recklessness generated by higher speeds or sabotage, leads NASCAR 
drivers to pursue a goal of consistency instead of supplying maximum effort.  In the con-
text of the model of Lazear and Rosen (1981), in equilibrium, all NASCAR drivers supply a 
similar amount of effort.  The empirical literature on the effects of tournament incentives 
on NASCAR drivers has focused on the lack of incentives to increase effort, and the nega-
tive consequences of increases in incentives in this setting. 
We return to the fundamental questions raised by applying standard tournament 
theory to NASCAR racing: does NASCAR have a non-linear prize structure, and does the 
existing NASCAR prize structure generate sufficient incentives for drivers to supply addi-
tional effort?  Using a comprehensive data set from 1,114 NASCAR races over the period 
1975-2009, we find that the monetary prize structure of individual NASCAR races is non-
linear, and that drivers appear to supply additional effort as the prize structure becomes 





Our data come from all 1,114 NASCAR races run in the 1975 through 2009 racing seasons.  
We collected data on the outcomes of each race, including the money and points earned   7 
by each participant, from the NASCAR web site (www.nascar.com).  The NASCAR web site 
contains the official results of all races since 1975, including the starting position, finishing 
position, status, points earned, winnings, and laps raced by each driver in each race.  It 
also contains other race-related data including the average speed of the winning car, the 
margin of victory of the winner, the number of lead changes in the race, the number of 
caution flags and the number of laps raced under caution flags during each race.  We 
augmented these data with information about the tracks that each race took place on, in 
terms of the length and configuration. 
Table 1 summarizes the relevant variables from these 1,114 NASCAR races.  We de-
flated winnings to real 2009 dollars using the CPI for All Urban Consumers.  We use the 
average speed of the winning car as our measure of effort in NASCAR races.  The median 
margin of victory in this sample is 1.19 seconds, and the margin of victory at the 75
th per-
centile is just 3.84 seconds, so the leaders in almost all races finish very close to each oth-
er.  The mean margin of victory is 5.9 seconds, but this is skewed by a small number of 
races (86) decided by more than two minutes.     
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics         
         
Variable  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Average Speed Winning Car  118.41  27.11  66.10  188.35 
Total Winnings  2,207,711  2,262,556  115,172  16,900,000 
Interquartile Range Winnings  23.43  15.12  2.01  84.80 
Standard Deviation of Winnings  3.07  3.27  0.45  43.98 
Number of Entrants  40  4.5  22  50 
Number of Caution Flags  7  3.5  0  22 
Length of a Lap  1.519  0.721  0.533  2.66 
Oval Track Shape  0.34  ---  ---  --- 
D or Quad Oval Track Shape  0.44  ---  ---  --- 
Tri Oval Track Shape  0.09  ---  ---  --- 
Road Course Track  0.07  ---  ---  --- 
 
The average speed of the winning car exhibits quite a bit of variation.  This is due in part to 
the number of caution, or yellow, flags that take place during NASCAR races and the num-
ber of laps raced under a caution flag.  A yellow caution flag is signaled during a NASCAR 
race when there is some hazard on the race course.  The most common reason for a cau-
tion flag is an accident, but it may also be due to debris on the track or inclement weather.  
Under a yellow flag all cars slow down and follow a pace car; passing is not permitted un-  8 
der caution flags.  The race continues at a reduced speed until the reason for the caution 
flag is removed. Only 11 races in the sample, about 1%, were run with no caution flags.   
The average real purse size in the sample is just over $2.2 million.  Purse size has 
clearly grown over time; the average real purse in 1976 was $430,000 and the average 
real purse in 2006 was $5.43 million.  We use two different measures of the dispersion of 
winnings in races: the interquartile range of winnings and the standard deviation of win-
nings.  Both will increase as the prize structure of the race becomes more non-linear.  We 
measure the interquartile range in thousands of dollars, and the standard deviation in ten 
thousands of dollars in order to generate easy to express parameter estimates.  Note that 
both the interquartile range and the standard deviation of the prize structure vary consid-
erably within the sample.  This variation occurs because the average purse size has grown 
and because different races use different prize structures and change these prize struc-
tures over time.  
The number of cars participating in a race will affect the speed, both because of 
the physical space occupied by the cars and because of strategic interaction among com-
petitors.  The number of entrants in each race varies both over time, and within seasons.   
The average field size in the 1970s was about 35 cars; this number has increased steadily 
over time; since the late 1990s most NASCAR race fields have contained 43 cars. 
The average speed of the winning car is clearly influenced by driver effort.  It can 
also be affected by characteristics of the track that the race takes place on.  NASCAR race 
tracks vary in terms of length and configuration.  The average length of a NASCAR track is 
1.5 miles.  The shortest track, Bristol International Speedway, is just over a half mile in 
length; the longest track, Talladega Superspeedway, is nearly five times as long.  The 
length of the track determines how many turns are in the race, which tends to slow 
speeds. 
NASCAR  tracks  have  four  basic  forms:  a  standard  oval  with  two  equal  length 
straight stretches, a D oval with one long straight stretch, a quad oval with one long 
straight stretch and three shorter straight stretches, a tri-oval with three equal length 
straight stretches, and “road course” tracks with many irregular turns.  Only three “road 
course”  tracks  have  been  used  in  NASCAR:  Riverside  International  Raceway,  Sears 
Point/Infineon Raceway, and Watkins Glen International.  The three tri oval tracks are 
Phoenix International Raceway, Pocono Raceway, and Talladega Superspeedway.  Most 
NASCAR tracks are either ovals or D or Quad ovals.  Each basic form provides different 
combinations of turns and straightaways, which will affect the speed of the cars. 
 
     9 
NASCAR Prize Structure 
 
A number of previous papers argued that NASCAR races have a compressed prize struc-
ture.  We have data on the prize structure, expressed in constant 2009 dollars, of all 1,114 
NASCAR races run over a 34 year period, a long enough period to assess the non-linearity 
of the prize structure.  Table 2 summarizes the average amount won by place for the first 
ten finishers in NASCAR races over this period.  Over this period, the winner of NASCAR 
races took home just under $190,000.  This figure includes all bonuses earned by drivers in 
each  race.    The  second  place  driver  took  home  almost  $124,000  on  average,  about 
$65,500 less.  Put another way, the first place driver in a NASCAR race earned more than 
50% more than the second place driver, and the second place driver earned almost 25% 
more than the third place driver.  The third place driver earned about half the amount 
that the winning driver earned. 
 
Table 2: Non-linearity of NASCAR Prize Structure 
       
  Average     
Place  Amount Won  Difference  % Increase 
1  $189,244  $65,535  53% 
2  $123,709  $23,997  24% 
3  $99,712  $15,584  19% 
4  $84,129  $8,855  12% 
5  $75,274  $9,247  14% 
6  $66,027  $4,282  7% 
7  $61,745  $3,357  6% 
8  $58,388  $1,893  3% 
9  $56,495  -$481  -1% 
10  $56,976     
 
The “bumpiness” in prize structure noted by von Allmen (2001) can clearly be seen 
in Table 2.  The percentage increase in winnings from moving up one place in the stand-
ings  does  not  diminish  uniformly,  and  due  to  bonuses  the  10
th  place  drivers  actually 
earned a bit more than the 9
th place drivers in this sample. Beyond 10
th place the prize 
structure in NASCAR levels out considerably, much like in other settings like professional 
golf.  But Table 2 clearly indicates that the actual monetary prize structure of individual 
NASCAR races held over the period 1975-2009 was non-linear, with the returns to moving 
up one place in the standings increasing significantly in the top five positions.  While spon-  10 
sorship, team contracts, and other factors might erode the effective prize structure, the 
information on Table 2 strongly contradicts the claims of a linear prize structure in NAS-
CAR that currently exist in the literature.  The key empirical issue focuses on the effects of 
this non-linear prize structure: does it provide enough of an incentive to get drivers to 





We examine the relationship between the effort put forth by NASCAR drivers and the 
prize structure of individual races.  In order to investigate this relationship, we estimate a 
linear reduced form model of the determination of effort put forth in NSACAR races, e.  
We estimate a model that explains observed variation in effort put forth by drivers in 
NASCAR season t in race i during week j at track k.  The empirical model is 
 
eijkt =  1at +  2bj + β1TCk + β2RCijt +  ijkt          (1)    
 
where eijkt is the effort put forth in the race, captured by the average speed of the winning 
car.  at is a vector of year dummy variables capturing all factors that affect the outcome of 
all NASCAR races in season t. NASCAR has undergone numerous rule changes in the past 
34 years, and this year dummy variable captures the overall environment facing NASCAR 
drivers in each season.  For example, technological changes over time have increased the 
average speed in NASCAR races, and improvements in equipment and pit crews may keep 
more cars in races, compressing the distribution of finishing times.  And NASCAR frequent-
ly implements rules to enhance uniformity in equipment that may also change racing 
speeds over time.  Any rules or conditions that apply to all NASCAR races in a particular 
season will be captured by these year indicator variables.  bj is a vector of week indicator 
variables.  The season-long points competition evolves over time, and the standings in the 
point competition might affect the incentives to put forth effort systematically from week 
to week.  In addition, other factors could change systematically over the course of the 
NASCAR season, like the amount of time that elapses from one race to the next and the 
distance between racetracks.  The week dummy variables capture the effects of these 
factors on effort.  TCk Is a vector of track-specific characteristics.  The characteristics of 
tracks, including their layout and length, affect the speed of races that take place on these 
tracks.  This vector includes the length of a lap at each track and indicators for the general 
shape of each track.  The standard oval shape is the omitted category.   11 
RCijt is a vector of characteristics of the individual races that affect effort.  This vec-
tor includes measures of the dispersion of the real monetary prize structure of each race, 
and other characteristics of each race like the number of entrants and the number of cau-
tion flags that occurred during the race.     1 ,  2, β1, and β2 are unknown parameters to 
be estimated.   
ijkt is an unobservable random error term that captures all other factors that af-
fect the effort put forth by NASCAR drivers.  These factors include the inherent random 
component of effort postulated by tournament theory as well as other random and unob-
servable factors affecting effort.  We assume that this random error term is independent 
and identically distributed with mean zero, although we allow the variance of this random 
error term to vary across races.  We estimate the unknown parameters of Equation (1) 
using the Ordinary Least Squares estimator with the usual White-Huber “sandwich” cor-
rection for heteroscedasticity.  Technically, we estimate a two-way fixed effect model, 
since we control for unobservable heterogeneity across seasons and across weeks of the 
season.  
 
Table 3: Dispersion of Prize Structure Affects Average Winning Speed   
Dependent Variable: Average Winning Speed       
             
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Interquartile Range  0.233  0.279  0.161  0.184  0.173  0.143 
  3.30  3.45  2.51  2.55  3.05  2.25 
Lap Length  27.84  30.43  24.01  25.82  19.66  22.02 
  37.74  30.70  29.63  24.49  14.21  22.70 
D or Quad Oval Track  11.87  10.11  10.28  8.953  8.032  7.096 
  11.41  8.89  10.53  8.53  9.46  7.74 
Tri Oval Track  9.29  9.64  7.01  7.834  4.299  4.669 
  5.94  4.83  4.08  3.71  2.61  2.33 
Race Course Track  -49.69  -49.70  -49.54  -48.88  -52.62  -52.77 
  -33.32  -29.60  -31.61  -29.00  -35.13  -32.68 
# of Entrants  ---  ---  1.771  1.653  2.235  2.135 
  ---  ---  10.14  9.01  14.21  12.85 
# of Caution Flags  ---  ---  ---  ---  -2.151  -2.114 
  ---  ---  ---  ---  -17.19  -17.77 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Week Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R
2  0.752  0.786  0.782  0.807  0.832  0.853 
N  1114  1114  1114  1114  1114  1114 
Asymptotic t-statistics shown below parameter estimates       12 
      
Table 3 contains parameter estimates, asymptotic t-statistics on a two tailed test 
of the null hypothesis that the estimated parameter is equal to zero for each parameter, 
and other standard regression diagnostics for several versions of Equation (1).  Again, the-
se results correct for heteroscedasticity using the standard White-Huber “sandwich” cor-
rection.  The measure of the dispersion of the monetary prize structure in each race is the 
interquartile range of the monetary prize structure of each race.  This is the difference 
between the first and third quartiles of the real monetary prize distribution, in thousands 
of 2009 dollars. 
Models 1 and 2 establish the basic relationship between the dispersion of the 
monetary prize structure and effort, as measured by the average speed of the winning car 
in each race.  All of the parameter estimates are statistically different from zero at the 5% 
level and the models explain between 75% and 85% of the observed variation in average 
speed of the winning car.  The estimated parameters on the track characteristics have 
plausible and intuitively appealing signs.  The longer is each lap at a track, the higher the 
average speed of the winning car, other things equal.  Longer tracks have longer straight 
sections of track, which allows drivers to drive faster.  The omitted track shape is a stand-
ard oval, and the results suggest that D or Quad oval tracks and tri-oval tracks produce 
higher average winning speeds, other things equal.  Race Course tracks like Watkins Glen, 
with  their  many  curves  and  irregular  setup,  produce  markedly  lower  average  winning 
speeds, roughly 50 miles per hour slower than those on oval tracks. 
The parameters of interest in Table 3 are the ones on the interquartile range of the 
monetary prize structure, and these parameter estimates reflect the effect of the incen-
tives generated by a non-linear prize structure on effort, as reflected by the average speed 
of the winning car in each race.  These parameter estimates are all positive and signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 5% level, suggesting that the more variable the prize 
structure in a NASCAR race, the more effort drivers put forth in that race.  We interpret 
this as supporting the predictions of tournament theory. 
The estimated sign and significance of the parameter on the interquartile range 
variable is not sensitive to the inclusion of other race specific control variables, the num-
ber of entrants and the number of caution flags during the race.  The estimated parame-
ters on these two race characteristics have appropriate signs and are statistically different 
from zero.  Each additional entrant in a NASCAR race is associated with an increase in the 
average speed of the wining car in that race of between 1.7 and 2.2 miles per hour. The 
expansion of NASCAR field size over time appears to have increased the effort put forth by 
drivers.  Each additional caution flag during the course of a race was associated with a 
decrease in the average speed of the winning car by about 2.1 miles per hour.  Since cau-  13 
tion flags require drivers to slow down and not to pass, this should clearly reduce the av-
erage speed in the race.   
Interquartile range is not the only possible measure of the non-linearity of the 
monetary prize structure of NASCAR races.  To assess the robustness of the results report-
ed on Table 3, we used an alternative measure of the dispersion of the monetary prize 
structure of each race, the standard deviation of the winnings paid to each participant in 
the race. Table 4 contains the results from estimating Equation (1) using this alternative 
measure of the dispersion of the monetary prize structure of races. 
 
Table 4: Alternative Dispersion of Prize Structure Measure      
Dependent Variable: Average Winning Speed         
             
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Standard Deviation   0.159  0.321  0.282  0.358  0.291  0.249 
of Prize Structure  1.19  1.87  2.01  2.27  2.53  1.95 
Lap Length  28.56  31.37  24.19  26.13  19.88  22.29 
  38.78  32.66  29.98  25.20  26.52  23.40 
D or Quad Oval Track  11.99  10.28  10.28  8.999  8.033  7.134 
  11.54  9.12  10.52  8.57  9.46  7.76 
Tri Oval Track  8.633  8.949  6.708  7.451  3.961  4.345 
  5.52  4.52  3.91  3.55  2.41  2.19 
Race Course Track  -50.77  -50.82  -49.98  -49.27  -53.12  -53.13 
  34.02  -30.40  -32.48  -29.56  -36.14  -33.35 
# of Entrants  ---  ---  1.820  1.709  2.288  2.178 
  ---  ---  10.34  9.31  14.38  13.09 
# of Caution Flags  ---  ---  ---  ---  -2.147  -2.117 
  ---  ---  ---  ---  -17.23  -17.84 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Week Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
R
2  0.749  0.783  0.782  0.807  0.832  0.853 
N  1114  1114  1114  1114  1114  1114 
Asymptotic t-statistics shown below parameter estimates     
 
The results displayed in Table 4 are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3.  The 
larger the dispersion of the prize structure, as measured by the standard deviation of the 
prize money for each race, the more effort is put forth by drivers in that race, other things 
equal.  The only difference between the results in Table 4 and those in Table 3 is that the 
estimated parameter on the standard deviation of the prize structure for Model 1 is not 
statistically different from zero.   14 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
 
While the estimated parameters on the interquartile range variable are statistically signifi-
cant, their relative size compared to the size of the estimated parameters on some other 
variables might lead readers to question the economic significance of these parameters.  
To illustrate the economic significance of these results, consider the estimated contribu-
tion made by the spread of the prize structure to the average speed in two races held at 
Talladega Superspeedway, a tri-oval racetrack.  In 1980, the interquartile range of this 
race was $9,724, roughly one standard deviation below the mean based on Table 1; in 
1989 the  interquartile  range  had  increased to $23,313,  which  is roughly  at the mean 
based on Table 1.  Based on the results from Model 4 of Table 3, which contains both year 
and week fixed effects and a control for the number of entrants, the interquartile range of 
the prize distribution in that range contributed to an increase in the average speed of the 
winning car of about 1.79 miles per hour in 1980.  The interquartile range of the prize 
structure in the 1989 race contributed to an increase in the average winning speed of 
about 4.29 miles per hour.  The difference, which shows the effect on the average winning 
speed of a move from about one standard deviation below the mean interquartile range 
to the mean, is 2.5 miles per hour.   
Becker and Huselid (1992) treated the number of caution flags in the race as un-
correlated with the equation error term.  However, a case can be made that the number 
of caution flags in a race depends on incentives to supply effort during a race, and thus 
could be correlated with the unobservable error term in equation (1).  The idea is that the 
more effort is supplied by drivers, the greater the potential for an accident, which would 
lead to a caution flag.  This concept is closely related to the sabotage incentive posited by 
von Allmen (2001).  If the number of caution flags is correlated with the unobservable er-
ror term, then the OLS estimator used here is neither unbiased nor consistent.  The usual 
remedy for this problem is to identify an instrument that is correlated with the number of 
caution flags and uncorrelated with the unobservable error term in equation (1) and use 
the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator.  However, finding an appropriate instrument 
may be difficult in this context.  Note that the significance of the estimated parameter on 
the prize spread variable does not change when the number of caution flags is dropped 
from the regression model, suggesting that any existing correlation between the number 
of caution flags and the equation error term does not lead to severe econometric prob-
lems in this case.  
Beginning in the 2004 season, NASCAR introduced a form of post-season competi-
tion, called “the Chase” into the racing schedule.  This 10 race postseason competition 
might generate different incentives throughout the season.  We estimated all of the mod-  16 
el specifications shown above with an indicator variable for racing seasons that included 
“the Chase” at the end of the season.  The inclusion of this indicator variable did not have 
any effect on the estimated parameters on the prize distribution spread shown on Tables 
3 and 4 above.    
The results above support the idea that the prize structure in NASCAR races gener-
ates incentives for drivers to provide more effort in races, confirming one of the main 
predictions of tournament theory.  As noted by von Allmen (2001) and others, the prize 
structure in NASCAR races is more compressed than the prize structure in professional 
golf, tennis and some other individual sports.  The results presented here suggest that 
NASCAR drivers respond to incentives generated by prize structures with less dispersion 
than found in professional golf and tennis.  This leads to the question of how much spread 
is required in a prize distribution to induce increased effort by participants.  Since NASCAR 
drivers respond to a smaller spread than professional golfers, a further examination of 
prize structure and effort in order to determine how much spread is required in the prize 
money distribution to induce contest effects appears warranted.   
Since NASCAR drivers respond to the incentives generated by the prize structure of 
races, and a large amount of detailed data on these races exist, further research in this 
area would be fruitful.  We use the average speed of the winning car as a measure of ef-
fort.  Institutional characteristics of NASCAR races provide alternative methods of measur-
ing effort.  For example, drivers qualify for races during preliminary competitions the week 
before the race.  These qualifying competitions take place on the same track, with no oth-
er competitors present; the top speed recorded by each driver during qualifying is used to 
seed the drivers at the start of the main race.  These qualifying times and places provide a 
measure of the ability of the driver and car going into the race in absolute terms and rela-
tive to the other competitors.  These qualifying times and starting positions could be used 
to construct a driver-specific measure of effort in each race and used to test similar pre-
dictions from tournament theory.  Also, NASCAR sponsors five stock car racing series in 
addition to the Sprint Cup Series, and prize structures and outcomes from these series 
could also be analyzed.   
Finally, the NASCAR Sprint Cup Series features both prizes for individual races and 
a season long points competition.  In this competition, points are awarded based on order 
of finish; the distribution of points is quite compressed, but the prize distribution for the 
point competition is highly non-linear.  The existence of two different prize payouts in 
NASCAR generates a race-within-a-race that may provide different incentives to drivers.  
To date, only Depken and Wilson (2004) and Schwartz, et al (2007) have examined the 
interaction between prizes in individual races and the season long points competition. 
Given the evidence developed here that drivers respond to the prize structure in individu-  17 
al races, a closer look at the relationship between these two competitions and the incen-
tives generated by them appears warranted.  
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